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USE OF PUBLIC GOODS AND ESTIMATION
OF INSTITUTIONS EFFICIENCY
It is well known that the creation and use of public goods is aimed
at reducing social costs and leveling market failures. However, this
paper will reveal that this is not always the case.
Let us consider the situation when the number of public goods
users considerably exceeds limit possibilities of these goods use.
Public roads and traffic jams are in question.
A large number of cars want to pass a road section at one and the
same time. Let us examine this situation in terms of the neoclassical
model of economic man. Each driver is individually motivated and
selfish, and aims to maximize his/her objective function. In this case
that is to drive this road section with minimum transport risks and
time and fuel costs. In addition, the objective function value (its
public value) of various vehicles will also differ. For example, in
case of a successful trip the car in which the driver is travelling
alone will maximize the objective function to one driver of this
vehicle only. If the driver is travelling along with 2 passengers, then
the degree in maximizing the objective function grows in multiple
numbers of times. If the vehicle is a rout taxi or bus, then the
satisfaction- and maximization degree of the objective function
increases manyfold.
Traffic jam is a shortage of road capacity in a given period of time,
that is, the inability to maximize the objective function due to the
scarcity of a resource, i.e. the capacity of the road in this particular case.
Another side of the problem under discussion is the question about
the origin and distribution of the individual and public expenses.
Individually motivated motorists strive to reach their destination as
fast as possible with time and fuel costs saved. Every motor-car
enthusiast striving selfishly to maximize individual utility function
7creates additional expenses for the same egoists who travel the same
route. As a result, total individual expenses of players involved in a
traffic jam grow, and, therefore, so do public costs.
Similarly, motor transport users’ expenses increase unevenly
during a traffic jam. When trying to use a limited resource being a
public good (highway is not private property, but it is referred to as
state, regional or municipal property), individually motivated players
are forced to maximize the use of this good which is worth less than
other goods, applying the law of maximizing utility. When used by an
individual player the cost of a public good for him/her tends to zero
(or it is very small as compared to the price /cost of private goods).
Therefore, marginal utility of a public good is always higher than that
of any private good substitute. That is why an individual player does
prefer a public good to similar private goods substitutes.
The same strategy will be applied by all participants of the traffic jam.
No player can minimize his/her costs of being in a traffic jam because his
behavior will have little impact on the overall picture of costs
distribution. Therefore individually motivated player is not economically
interested in reducing the use of a limited resource (a good), that is, he
would not solve the problem of a traffic jam personally.
Price forms of regulation in the number of vehicles (price
restriction of demand) will not have the desired effect as the road is
not a commodity but a public good. Excess demand of any good or
service is artificially restricted by price. It means that travel on the
«problem road area» at a certain time period is more expensive than at
the time when the risk for a traffic jam to occur is minimal.
Automatically the increased price for travel would force the part of
motor-car enthusiasts to give up travelling at this time of the day, and
the toll rate could regulate this part.
The problem is that the road is not a common commodity, but
performs the functions of a public good, and is used by the whole
community, although its construction and maintenance expenses are
paid by the government. A public good has no price forms of
regulation and no mechanism to reach an equilibrium level of its use.
The presented example allows us to formulate the traffic jam effect
(author’s name).
The traffic jam effect: when individually motivated player uses at
least one public good (a commodity or resource) in his/her market
activities in addition to his/her use of private property things from a
certain moment it results in ineffectiveness of market mechanism
application of flexible market price and requires public institution to
be created and used in order to increase the efficiency of public
8property usage and minimize social costs, i.e. the sum of the private
players’ individual expenses).
There occurs an obvious contradiction between the purpose of
creating a public good, and the results of its use. Thus, the aim of a
public good creation can be either «market failures» leveling or an
effort to reduce total individual expenses. For example, free secondary
education minimizes parents’ costs when giving their children basic
knowledge each citizen of the given society should have, and reduces
total social costs of the human capital reproduction. Individual
education of every separate child or teaching schoolchildren groups
on the market basis would significantly increase total social costs
which in the very particular case minimize a public good — «free
secondary education».
In the example with a highway as a public good — this mechanism
starts to fail, and one can observe a clear contradiction.
When a public good is used by individually motivated players in a
certain case (at a definite period of time) it results in the increase of
their total individual expenses.
The list of the examples can be long indeed: the functioning of
other public goods — health care, medical service, health resort
treatment, etc. — are referred to such paradoxes.
An obvious way out of this situation will be the development of
the institution to regulate the use of limited public or group property.
Thus, the conclusion is the following: there is a need to establish
the institutionwhere there are no clearly fixed property rights, or there
is at least one object of public or group ownership. The use of a public
good in individually motivated players’ activities involves a public
institution. To improve the efficiency of using collective or group
ownership by individually motivated players and institution needs to
be established.
In other words, any-to-implement public good requires a
simultaneous introduction of the (formal) institution to improve the
efficiency of this good public use, while the effectiveness of the
institution (or institutional environment) in its turn one can treat as the
efficient performance of those public goods the use of which this
institution regulates.
Modern development of economic relations becomes more and
more complicated. There appear new forms of relations and forms of
property allocation. These transformations are followed by the change
in conceptual bases of leading schools and trends in economics.
At present, the mainstream is based on the neoclassical synthesis
principles and describes the behavior of individually motivated
9players (households and firms), as well as the measures of the state
(or, in fact, the same individually motivated players but with a more
complex objective function). And that was enough to describe the
economy of the time when these theories were first formulated.
Today social and economic relations have become much more
complicated. New forms of interaction and cooperation such as public
and private partnership have appeared, global problems (globalization
and ecological problems being examples) have been intensified, and
property relations have become more complex. Nowadays a coherent
mainstream model is insufficient not only for the effective simulation
of economic processes, but even for its convincing description.
These facts explain the objective necessity for the mainstream to
be consistently replaced by the theories that belong to Neoinstitutional
School.
The use of this effect gives the opportunity to explain the concept
of «institutional effectiveness». For Douglass North the goal of the
institution establishment is «minimizing transaction costs» Therefore,
the institution effectiveness or institutional efficiency is the ability of
this institution to perform its function that is to minimize transaction
costs). Measuring transaction costs in its turn involves a number of
problems: definition ambiguity, measurement uncertainty, subjective
evaluation, etc.
Measuring transformation costs doesn’t deal with such problems.
Therefore, if the institution is considered a way of minimizing total
individual transformation costs, then the institutional effect will be these
costs reduction, which has occurred owing to the institution performance.
In the example of traffic jam given above that is time saving and a
reduction in fuel losses by public from being in a traffic jam.
To sum up, when measuring institution that regulates the
functioning of public goods by means of transformation, rather than
transaction costs, is applied, it, of course, considerably weakens this
assessment value. But, at the same time, it enables the effectiveness of
using institution to be practically calculated and measured when
applying neoclassical theoryinstruments, which confirms the viability
of economic imperialism ideas once again.
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